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ABSTRACT. Ferraro and Simpson (2002) argue that when markets are competitive,
payments for environmental services (PES) are more cost-effective in achieving
environmental goals than more indirect approaches such as subsidies to capital. However,
when eco-entrepreneurs face non-price rationing in input or output markets, as is typical
for credit in developing countries for example, we show that interventions which relax
constraints can be more cost-effective than PES. One corollary of this is that such indirect
approaches are preferred to PES by interveners (e.g., donors) and eco-entrepreneurs alike.
Both of these outcomes are more likely when constraints are severe. This has implications
for schemes with dual environment and poverty alleviation objectives.
1. Introduction
The term ‘Payments for Environmental Services’ (PES) defines a wide
range of incentive mechanisms to address the underlying causes of
environmental degradation by inducing behavioural changes among local
actors (Bulte et al., 2008). There are numerous examples of how payments
from beneficiaries within a locality, river-basin, region or even globally have
been implemented in attempts to overcome environmental externalities of
one kind or another. There are global and multilateral mechanisms such as
the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol and the Global
Environment Facility, as well as more localised PES schemes such as the
Primampiro municipal watershed-protection scheme in Ecuador (Wunder
and Alba´n, 2008). In addition to varying in their geographical scope, PES
schemes also vary in the nature of the incentive provided and hence in
∗ The authors would like to thank David Simpson and the two anonymous referees
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their effectiveness in any given circumstance. The purpose of this paper is
to shed further light on the relative cost-effectiveness of PES with respect
to other, more indirect policy instruments, also commonly used to supply
environmental services around the world.
In PES schemes, such as the Costa Rican pagos por servicios ambientales
(PSA) scheme and the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme in China,
compensation is offered to farmers directly for each unit of land reforested
or conserved (e.g., Xu and Cao, 2002; Pagiola, 2008). More indirect policy
approaches can be conceptualised to provide incentives via some associated
input to production. These so-called ‘joint-production’ activities include
selective logging, eco-certification and eco-tourism (see Kotchen, 2005;
Donovan et al., 2006; Macqueen et al., 2008).1 Recent theoretical and
empirical work has naturally shaped the views of the institutions involved
in implementing policy to supply environmental services, as well as the
design of schemes on the ground. For obvious reasons, perhaps the most
influential contributions in this respect have been those which address the
question of the relative cost-effectiveness of different policy approaches to
supply environmental services.2
One virtually unequivocal answer to this question can be found in an oft-
cited and influential paper by Ferraro and Simpson, who, using a broad
definition of PES to include both PES as defined in this paper (‘direct
payments’) and indirect policy approaches (‘indirect payments’), conclude,
‘Conservation practitioners should be wary of adopting indirect payments’
(Ferraro and Simpson, 2002: 345, henceforth F&S). F&S reach this conclusion
by employing duality theory to analyse the mechanics of different policy
approaches to an ‘ecological entrepreneur’, for whom conserved land is
an input to an eco-friendly production process, e.g., ecotourism. Although
their approach presupposes perfectly elastic supply in input and output
markets and profit-maximising behaviour by a price-taking entrepreneur,
their conclusion appears to be remarkably robust, even when some of
these assumptions are relaxed.3 One corollary of this result is that, in
the absence of side payments, the preferences of the NGO or donor and
1 Non-timber forest products (NTFP), on the other hand, are not necessarily
produced jointly with environmental services. Indeed, some NTFP collection may
actually be unsustainable (we thank the referee for highlighting this point).
2 For empirical work see e.g., Xu and Cao (2002); Wa¨tzold and Schwerdtner (2005);
Drechsler et al. (2007). For theoretical work see e.g., Ferraro and Simpson (2002,
2005) and Muller and Albers (2004).
3 Ferraro and Simpson (2005) acknowledge that their original analysis neglects
some important features that characterise activities in developing countries, in
particular missing and imperfect markets for inputs and outputs. Typically, self-
sufficiency/autarkic production arises where markets are missing for inputs or
outputs, or where significant transactions costs exist (Key et al., 2000). In the
context of ‘non-separable’ households producing environmental services, Muller
and Albers (2004) find that, with the exception of the trivial case, where there
are no markets for households’ output (consumption goods), ‘direct payments’
generally outperform ‘indirect payments’ adding further weight to F&S’s (2002)
result.
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eco-entrepreneur are generally opposed. The donor will prefer the cost-
effective PES, while the eco-entrepreneur will prefer the more indirect
approach, since it profits from the additional payments required. An
alternative interpretation of this result is that, in a developing country
context there is tension between environmental and poverty alleviation
objectives.
It is well documented, however, that among the many market
imperfections found in developing countries, quantity constraints and non-
price rationing are among the most common, particularly in the agricultural
sector (see e.g., Azam et al., 2001; Colman et al., 2005; Petrick, 2005). Input
and output quotas are obvious examples and, at the extreme, markets may
be missing completely. Beyond this, perhaps the most frequent example of
non-price rationing in developing countries is credit rationing (e.g., Hoff
and Stiglitz, 1993). While there are several definitions of credit rationing,
it is usually thought of as a situation in which the borrower’s private
demand is higher at the current rate of interest than the loan offered by
the lender (Petrick, 2005).4 This description of developing countries has
led to frequent calls in development policy circles for the relaxation of
constraints, particularly in relation to credit (e.g., Azam et al., 2001; Vakis
et al., 2004). While such issues are frequently discussed in the context
of agricultural production, similar problems undoubtedly beset the ‘eco-
entrepreneurs’ that are the focus of policy implementation, and were the
subject of analysis by F&S. For example, there are often missing markets for
the necessary inputs, such as the skills required to develop business plans,
viable market contacts and quality products (RCW, 2007). Credit rationing
is also likely due to the risks inherent in joint production, insecure tenure
and asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers (Ascher, 1994;
RCW, 2007).5
In the context of joint-production enterprises, the implications for policy
are obvious: Indirect approaches which relax quantity constraints offer an
important opportunity to expand ecological entrepreneurship and generate
environmental services. Indeed, there are already numerous examples of
this kind of intervention in which NGOs or governments provide assistance
to relax certain constraints, rather than direct incentive payments. One
example, in the context of credit, is the Brazilian government’s programme,
4 Ghosh et al. (2000) make the distinction between macro- and micro-credit rationing.
Regarding the former, sections of the economy are rationed or excluded from
credit, this being the lenders’ response to adverse selection. The definition in
the text is classic micro-credit rationing. The causes and implications of each are
generally different. For instance, asymmetric information (resulting in adverse
selection and/or moral hazard), pervasive risk, limited collateral and enforcement
costs conspire to ensure that lenders ration credit in both formal and, albeit to a
lesser extent, informal markets (Azam et al., 2001). For recent empirical examples
of credit rationing in developing countries, see Mohieldin and Wright’s (2000)
study of Egypt, and Barslund and Tarp’s (2007) study of Vietnam.
5 Of course, property rights to ecosystems, such as forests, are typically insecure
and hence cannot generally be used as collateral (e.g., Ascher, 1994).
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FNO-Especial, which provides credit to small forest enterprises based in the
Amazon that have environmental and social goals (Campos et al., 2005).6 In
other cases contributions come in the form of complementary inputs, such
as tourism infrastructure, product marketing and processing facilities (see
e.g., Wunder, 2000; MacQueen et al., 2008), all of which give rise to another
important question: In the presence of quantity constraints, which policy is
more cost effective, PES or more indirect approaches that relax constraints?
This paper goes part way to answering this question.
In order to make direct comparisons with F&S we return to the parsimony
of their benchmark model of a donor and an eco-entrepreneur each with
perfect information. Our sole addition to the model is a quantity constraint
on an input to the production process, the relaxation of which is the objective
of the donor’s indirect scheme. This quantity constraint is open to a rather
general interpretation: a credit constraint, an input quota and analogous
arguments can be made for constraints on output.7 We apply the work of
Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) who extended duality theory to the constrained
profit function. For relative cost-effectiveness, we compare the cost to the
donor of subsidising inputs directly versus the indirect policy of relaxing
capital constraints, which can be thought of as the purchase of inputs or
provision of capital by the donor. Thus, the deadweight welfare losses of
each approach are compared alongside the creation of positive quota rents
from the implementation of an indirect policy. The results of the analysis
are revealing and run counter to F&S in two senses. Firstly, PES are shown
to have no systematic cost advantage over a more indirect approach which
relaxes constraints. Secondly, there are instances when both the donor and
the eco-entrepreneur prefer the indirect approach. In these instances, it is
possible that indirect schemes are more likely to achieve dual environment
and poverty objectives. Within the confines of the model these outcomes
are more likely when constraints are, or rationing is, severe.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model,
while section 3 analyses the overall cost-effectiveness of each intervention.
Sections 4 and 5 analyse the preferences of the donor and eco-entrepreneur
respectively. Section 6 offers a discussion of the results, while 7 concludes.
2. Policies to supply environmental services: a model with constraints
In order to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of PES and a policy
to relax constraints, we follow closely the model of F&S. We have a
profit-maximising eco-entrepreneur (henceforth, firm) that operates an
‘ecologically benign’ production process with two variable inputs to
6 There are many other examples. For instance, in the Lacandon forest of Mexico,
eco-entrepreneurs receive credit from the Fondo Nacional de Empresas en
Solidaridad (National Fund of Enterprises in Solidarity) to buy new boats,
outboard motors and equipment for an eco-tourism venture (Hernandez-Cruz
et al., 2005). Around the world, other programmes are run by organisations such
as the Global Environment Facility and the Asian Development Bank (RCW, 2007).
7 We posit that where inputs are constrained or markets for inputs are missing,
entrepreneurs may fail to reach their potential. Similarly, where credit is rationed,
under-investment and an inability to smooth production over time are common
consequences (Petrick, 2005).
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production, forest and capital. ‘Forest’, F, represents any ecological attribute
useful in the generation of an eco-friendly output. ‘Capital’, K, represents
some arbitrary input. Thus, a quantity, Q, of an eco-friendly product is
produced using a production technology, f(K, F). This technology represents
an economic activity such as eco-tourism that allows environmental
services, for instance, biodiversity, to flow from the forest used in eco-
production activities. The market prices of output, capital and forest are PQ,
PK, and PF, respectively, where PF is the opportunity cost of using forest
in eco-production and could represent the returns to converting the forest
to agricultural production. Following F&S, we assume that K is a technical
complement to forest in eco-production, i.e., ∂F
∂ PK
< 0.8 Moreover, as in F&S,
we also assume that a unit of forest in eco-production provides the same
quantity and quality of environmental services as a unit of conserved forest.
In the absence of outside intervention, the firm uses and thus conserves
forest for eco-production. The decision of the firm, therefore, concerns the
quantity of forest to allocate to eco-production given that its cost as an input
to production is PF.
We depart from the benchmark of F&S by assuming that capital, K, is
subject to non-price rationing and limited to K¯ . As well as reflecting credit-
rationing or input quotas, this constraint could also approximate missing
markets (K¯ = 0). This approach is perhaps closest to the analysis of non-
separability by Muller and Albers (2004) in which market constraints are
addressed in the context of a utility-maximising household. However, while
Muller and Albers focused on the response of constrained households to
conventional PES schemes and ‘agricultural development programmes’,
our focus is on the cost-effectiveness of relaxing quantity constraints.9
Henceforth, we refer to the latter policy as an ‘indirect approach’, since
it is an alternative means of supplying environmental services.
The return to the model of F&S, and the focus on profit rather than
utility maximisation, allows us to obtain general results concerning the
cost-effectiveness of these interventions in a reasonably tractable manner.
For simplicity, we assess cost-effectiveness in the context of a constraint
on inputs, although parallel arguments apply to output constraints.
Fortunately, the theory of firm behaviour under quantity constraints is
already well developed and we apply the work of Fulginiti and Perrin
(1993) to analyse constrained profit functions.
Define the constrained profit function as
C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ , z) = max
F
PQ f (F , K¯ ) − PF F − PK K¯ , (1)
where z represents other fixed factors. This can be contrasted to the
unconstrained profit function U(PQ, PF, PK; z), which describes the solution
to the unconstrained problem. It is straightforward to show that the
constrained profit function is related to the unconstrained profit function
8 Without this assumption, a constraint on capital promotes forest cover compared
to the unconstrained outcome.
9 Muller and Albers (2004) model agricultural development programmes as
increasing productivity of agricultural production (e.g., f (F, K)) through a
multiplicative parameter α, such that production is measured as αf (F, K).
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Figure 1. Virtual prices and quota rent for (a) rationed input and (b) rationed output
in the following way (see Appendix A for details):
C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ , z) = U(PQ, PF , Pv; z) + (Pv − PK )K¯ , (2)
where Pv is the ‘virtual’ or shadow price of capital, i.e., the price which
would induce an unrestricted firm to choose the quantity K¯ . Each value of
K¯ has a unique virtual price. Figure 1 shows the virtual prices for input and
output quotas respectively. Also shown in figure 1 is the quantity (Pv − PK),
which is often called the ‘quota rent’. This is an important determinant of
the results that follow.
Following F&S we assume that a donor wants to induce greater forest
conservation than the firm would find privately beneficial under prevailing
market conditions. In F&S, the donor has two options for inducing greater
conservation: subsidies to ‘Forest’ or ‘Capital’ inputs. That is, PES or the
indirect approach, respectively. In the case presented here, the donor also
has two options: (1) payments in the form of a subsidy to forest land, or (2)
indirect provision of forest land via relaxation of the constraint on capital,
K¯ . The latter could involve the provision of inputs as opposed to cash
subsidies to capital (or output).
We follow F&S and compare the relative cost-effectiveness of policies in
achieving a unit change on forest land. Hotelling’s Lemma applied to the
constrained profit function, together with the derivative of the constrained
profit function with respect to the constrained input, K¯ , yield respectively
(see Appendix A)
−CF = F ,
CK¯ = (Pv − PK ) .
Choosing dPF and dK so as to induce a unit change in forested land, F, gives
the following relationship:10
d F = 1 = −CF F d PF =
∂F C
∂ PF
d PF = −CF K¯ d K =
∂F C
∂ K¯
d K (3)
10 Note that throughout, CF = ∂
C
∂ PF
, CK¯ =
∂C
∂ K¯ , 
C
F F = ∂
2C
∂ P2F
and CK¯ K¯ =
∂2C
∂ K¯ 2 .
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Following Fulginiti and Perrin (1993), who describe the Hessian of the
constrained profit function in terms of the derivatives of the unconstrained
function, the impact of the indirect policy can be expressed as
1 = −CF K¯ d K =
UF v
Uvv
d K , (4)
where the subscript v refers to the derivative with respect to the ‘virtual’
price of capital, Pv.
The construct of virtual prices and the representation in equation (4)
are convenient since they allow the analysis to be undertaken using the
unconstrained profit function, making the results more directly comparable
to F&S. Equations (3) and (4) exploit the duality between the derivative of
the constrained profit function with respect to K and the unconstrained
profit function with respect to Pv. To be clear, the derivative of the
constrained profit function with respect to the virtual Pv yields the
unconstrained demand for capital K, while the derivative of the constrained
profit function with respect to K¯ yields the virtual/shadow price.
We now proceed by determining the cost-effective intervention, and then
analyse the donor’s and firm’s preferred interventions.
3. Cost-effective policy to supply environmental services
For PES, the cost to the donor and the impact on firm profits can be described
in a manner similar to that of F&S. The indirect policy of relaxing capital
constraints requires the purchase of inputs by the donor. We undertake the
analysis assuming that the unit resource cost of capital is the underlying
market price PK. Questions remain concerning the share of the costs and
benefits of this policy between the firm and the donor, but this only becomes
important when discussing the intervention preferred by each party. It is
also likely that the cost of transacting in each market differs. For ease of
presentation, we assume for the moment that transactions costs, be they
fixed or variable, are the same for each intervention.11
Using the relations between the constrained and unconstrained profit
functions allows the cost-effective analysis to be undertaken in virtual price-
space. Appendix B shows that the incremental cost (dC) of using an indirect
approach rather than PES is given by12
dC = d K
2
[−d P Iv − d P Dv ] − (P0v − PK ) d K . (5)
11 As discussed by Key et al. (2000), transactions costs have fixed and proportional
dimensions. In this sense we could define the price paid by the donor as P∗ =
PK (1 + δ), where δ represents the proportional transaction cost. The overall
cost of the intervention could also include a fixed element, R, reflecting search
costs relative to the direct intervention. We also ignore costs associated with the
implementation of the contract in each case. The model could be extended to
include such costs, but this is left for future work.
12 Throughout the superscript 0 refers to the pre-intervention level of a variable and
superscript 1 refers to the post-intervention level. Similarly, I refers to indirect
intervention and D refers to PES.
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This expression has clear parallels with F&S.13 Whereas F&S compare the
cost-effectiveness of each policy approach by comparing the quantities
of capital needed in each case, here the comparison is made in terms of
changes in virtual prices. The term d P Iv is the change in the virtual price as
a consequence of relaxing the constraint on capital, K¯ . The term d P Dv is the
change in the virtual price of capital as a consequence of the direct subsidy
to forest land. Given the assumptions, the former is negative and the latter
is positive.
As shown in Appendix B, the first term in equation (5) is positive, since it
has the same sign as the determinant of the Hessian of the constrained
profit function. The second term is the quota rent associated with the
intervention and is positive as explained above.14 Hence, the sign of dC is
indeterminate. If equation (5) is positive, then PES outperform the indirect
approach in terms of cost-effectiveness. Further manipulations yield the
following approximation for the marginal cost:
dC
d K
= PK − 12
(
P1Iv + P1Dv
)
. (6)
This leads to proposition 1:
Proposition 1. When the unit resource cost of capital is P, the relaxation of input
constraints will be more cost-effective than PES to forest land when P is less than
the average of the terminal virtual price under PES and an indirect approach, P1Dv
and P1Iv , respectively. That is
P <
1
2
(
P1Iv + P1Dv
)
.
Proof. This follows from equation (6). 
Figures 2 and 3 provide a graphical comparison of policy interventions
under the assumption that the donor can choose either one or the other.
Figure 2 illustrates the analysis for the case of a severe input constraint. In
this case PK  P1Dv , P1Iv , and it is obvious that the indirect approach would
be preferred to PES.15 Graphically, the second term on the right-hand side
of equation (5), the total quota rent, is given by c in figure 2.16 The term
1
2 d P
I
v d K is given by (negative) area b and
1
2 d P
D
v d K is given by (negative)
13 F&S show that PES are always more cost-effective than an indirect approach and
that the cost saving is proportional to
d PK
2
[d K I − d K D],
where dKI is the change in capital under an indirect approach, dKD is the change
in capital under PES and dPK is the subsidy to capital.
14 This term would be negative in the case of an output constraint. This is shown in
figure 1(b).
15 Figure 2 also shows that if the resource cost of the intervention rises to P∗, the cost
advantage for an indirect approach declines.
16 This is the total quota rent over the interval dK, not the marginal quota rent as
defined in figure 2.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X09990167
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 15:48:30, subject to the Cambridge Core
Environment and Development Economics 227
Figure 2. PES vs the indirect approach (for Capital, K) – a severe constraint
Figure 3. PES vs the indirect approach (for Capital, K) – a minor constraint
area a. Relative cost-effectiveness is given by a comparison of areas a and
(b + c). In this case, the area (b + c) represents the additional profits to the
firm and is clearly large and positive.
Figure 3 shows a case at the other extreme in which the donor would
effectively ‘over-egg the pudding’ in order to achieve its environmental
services target. Although the quota rent exists, area c, it is much smaller
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than the large and negative deadweight loss, area b. This loss outweighs
the deadweight loss under PES, given by area a. In addition to this, capital
is increased beyond what would be efficient in the absence of constraints
(K∗), thereby causing a social loss. Here, PES are more cost-effective.
F&S compared the deadweight loss associated with different policy
approaches when markets function perfectly. Loosely speaking, in the
context of figures 2 and 3, F&S compared areas a and b and showed that
the former is almost always smaller than the latter. Where markets are
constrained, however, the total quota rent, area c, must also be considered.
What proposition 1 and figures 2 and 3 show is that when constraints
are severe, other things being equal, the relaxation of constraints can be
more cost-effective than PES. This finding differs from F&S and illustrates
an important example in which PES are not preferred to more indirect
alternatives to supply environmental services. Effectively, the quota rent
represents a reduction in the funds required to achieve the targeted change
in forest land under an indirect approach, compared to PES, where no such
rents are released.
The preceding analysis also presents the possibility that a fully informed
donor could obtain a kind of optimum optimorum by employing a combined
policy strategy. That is, by first removing the constraint via the provision
of capital at the world price in the quantities desired by the firm, and then
subsidising forest land directly. The theory as it stands suggests that the
firm would purchase K∗ of capital, at which point it would be cost-effective
to subsidise forest land directly a` la F&S. Once again, the cost-effective-
combined strategy will depend on the severity of the constraint.
Of course, there are many possible behavioural and informational
assumptions that could be explored. The presence of rents suggests the
possibility of arbitrage between each party and that the analysis of
bargaining power could be apposite. The presence of credit rationing points
to an analysis of informational asymmetries, and a discussion of the ability
of the donor to overcome these asymmetries and relax the constraint. We
return to this in section 6, but for now we remain with the simple framework
and analyse the conditions under which the donor and firm prefer PES or
the indirect approach.
4. The donor’s preferred policy
The donor must pay either −dPFF with PES, or PKdK under the policy of
relaxing the constraint. The donor will prefer PES if
−d PF F < PK d K . (7)
Appendix C shows that this condition becomes
ηUK F
ηCF F
< ηUK K +
1
K
∂K U
∂ Pv
(
P0v − PK
)
, (8)
where ηCi j is the constrained elasticity of demand for input i with respect
to price of input j, and ηUi j is the unconstrained equivalent.
17 This is a
17 Elasticities are defined as follows: ηi j = − ∂xi∂p j
p j
xi
. Note that ηCF F , η
U
K K and η
U
K F > 0.
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convenient form for the result since it reveals the dependence on the virtual
price elasticity of demand for capital: ηUK K , and the quota rent associated
with the constraint (Pv − PK ). The result is analogous to that of F&S, but
introduces some important differences. F&S show that in the case of perfect
markets, the donor will prefer PES (‘direct payments’) if the following
inequality holds:
ηuK F
ηuF F
< 1, (9)
which F&S show is always the case for homothetic technologies and some
non-homothetic ones. This leads to proposition 2:
Proposition 2. If the eco-entrepreneur is a profit maximiser and subject to a
quantity constraint in an input market, a policy that relaxes the constraint in the
input market will be the donor’s preferred policy to increase forest cover if
1. the quota rent associated with the constraint is large: (P0v − PK );
2. the resource cost of the constrained input is low: PK is low;
3. the demand for capital is highly inelastic with respect to its own (virtual) price:
ηUK K is small.
Proof. This follows from the inspection of equation (8), noting that ∂K
U
∂ Pv
< 0
and (P0v − PK ) > 0 for an input constraint. (See also Appendix C). 
In a world of perfect markets, the donor will almost always prefer PES
to the indirect approach, as shown by F&S. When constraints exist in input
markets, this conclusion is no longer robust. When a severe constraint exists
and the quota rent is large, the donor will prefer to relax input constraints
rather than subsidise forest. This preference is also enhanced by the fact that
the constrained own-price elasticity of demand for forest land is smaller
than the unconstrained: ηCF F < η
U
F F . This means that a larger subsidy is
required for a given response. Both of these features can conspire to make
the indirect approach more preferable.
5. The eco-entrepreneur’s preferred policy
When the firm is constrained in an input market, for small changes in PF or
K, the firm’s profits will change respectively as follows:
dCF =
∂C
∂ PF
d PF = −d PF F ,
dCK =
∂C
∂K
d K = P0v d K ,
where the latter comes from equation (18) in Appendix A, and assumes that
the firm receives the additional inputs for free (does not pay PK). Hence the
firm prefers PES if
−d PF F > P0v d K . (10)
This leads to proposition 3:
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Figure 4. Donor vs eco-entrepreneur’s preferences over PES and indirect approaches
Proposition 3. Three outcomes are possible for an input constraint: (i) the donor
prefers PES and the firm prefers the indirect approach; (ii) vice versa and (iii) both
donor and firm prefer the indirect approach.
Proof. Inspection of equations (10) and (7), noting P0v > PK reveals that
(i) if −dPFF < PKdK, the donor prefers PES and the firm prefers the
indirect approach; (ii) the reverse is true if −d PF F > P0v d K and (iii) if
P0v d K > −d PF F > PK d K , then both the donor and the firm prefer the
indirect approach. 
Figure 4 elaborates on proposition 3 and shows the intermediate values
of the cost of PES (−dPFF) at which the donor and firm will both desire
the indirect approach. The area of agreement is large when the quota rent
is large, i.e., when the input constraint is severe. One interpretation of this
result is that environmental and poverty alleviation objectives need not be
in tension. Where constraints are severe, the indirect policy approach not
only provides cost-effective provision of forest land in this case but also
provides the largest transfer to eco-entrepreneurs. We now discuss these
implications in further detail.18
6. Discussion
In this paper, we compared the cost-effectiveness of payments for
environmental services with an indirect approach that relaxes market
constraints, where constraints can be understood to represent any type
of non-price rationing of inputs and outputs. With this minor adaptation,
which better reflects the situation in many developing countries, cost-
effectiveness is investigated following Ferraro and Simpson (2002) using the
duality between the constrained and unconstrained profit function shown
by Fulginiti and Perrin (1993).
18 The mechanics of relaxing the output constraint are slightly different. If the
constraint can be relaxed at a unit cost P to the donor, then equations (7) and (10)
become −F d PF < Pd K and −F d PF > (PK − P0v )d K , respectively, if the NGO
receives the market price for output. Similar areas of agreement occur when
P > (PK − P0v ).
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The underlying premise of F&S is that donor funds are directed towards
the eco-output price or to facilitate the acquisition of complementary
inputs such as tourism infrastructure, product marketing and processing
facilities. Local agents such as communities faced with cheaper inputs or
higher output prices will therefore increase production, hence increasing
the demand for intact ecosystems as an input to production. The key
assumption is that, prior to the intervention, agents face perfectly elastic
supply or demand and can buy profit-maximising quantities of the inputs
they need at prevailing market prices. The addition of a quantity constraint
is a simple way to analyse the cost-effectiveness of differing policy
approaches in the presence of market constraints.
The theoretical results differ from F&S on two counts. First, PES are not
systematically more cost-effective than an indirect approach which relaxes
the market constraint. Second, there are instances when both donor and
recipient prefer the indirect approach. Within the limited context of our
model, both outcomes are more likely when market constraints are severe.
In order for these results to be useful to the practitioner, it is important to
give them a practical interpretation.19
Quantity restrictions and other forms of non-price rationing appear to
be very common among small-scale entrepreneurs in developing countries,
with perhaps credit rationing as the most obvious example. While credit
rationing may be as pertinent an issue in eco-production as in agriculture,
where constraints on credit for eco-entrepreneurs are relaxed, there may
still be problems in accessing other inputs necessary for production. In
fact attracting credit may be contingent on having access to other inputs
in the first place (RCW, 2007). This suggests that modelling behaviour
under quantity constraints of one sort or another is extremely apposite.
Indeed, there are numerous empirical examples of interventions that have
attempted to boost eco-production activities and increase the area of forest
being preserved via policy to relax underlying constraints.
So, what types of inputs are likely to be constrained? The answer
to this may depend on the eco-production process under consideration,
although some generalisations can be made. In Suriname, for example,
a bio-prospecting agreement between local tribes and the International
Cooperative Biodiversity Group (ICBG), a US government-funded
programme, led to the provision of inputs to local communities in the form
of training, information and technology transfer (Gue´rin-McManus et al.,
1996). These inputs were an integral part of the drug development process,
19 One interpretation of these results is that care should be taken in interpreting
axiomatic models of production. Firstly, it seems clear that minor changes
in the assumptions can change the results dramatically. Secondly, since it is
always possible to generate a result from such models, due consideration of the
‘applicability’ of the model should be an important part of its interpretation.
In this respect, a model in which markets are not perfect and are constrained
appears to be more applicable to the developing-country context. Nevertheless,
the continued representation of technology as a ‘black box’ masks many issues
pertinent to production processes, such as the social relationship between inputs.
We thank Dan Bromley for reminding us of these issues.
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for example, in the extraction of plant chemicals from organic matter. In this
and other cases, such as those involving selective logging, there exists a need
to support first-stage processing on a small scale, for example, by facilitating
the acquisition of simple grading, processing or packaging techniques.
As a result of small-scale production of natural products, and regional
and seasonal variability in supply quality and quantity, it is often difficult
to reach a scale of production that is of commercial interest to buyers in
domestic or international markets. Here coordination problems among
entrepreneurs, for example, can exacerbate capital constraints and limit
the scale of production. One way of dealing with and overcoming both
the quality and scale problem has been for firms to group together as
cooperatives or associations. These are often initiated or at least enabled
by third parties, such as donors and NGOs, who effectively resolve this
constraint (MacQueen et al., 2008). Moreover, eco-products generally cater
to niche markets and despite rapid growth in recent years are still typically
found in developed rather than developing or emerging markets. This
suggests that at least some inputs to joint production may not be easily
available via the market, particularly more intangible ones such as skills
development and technology transfer, and may partially explain why they
tend to be supplied by third parties. The same could be said of interventions
to relax constraints on output.
In addition, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s
(UNCTAD) BioTrade Initiative20 recorded that eco-entrepreneurs often
lack clear business plans with well-elaborated product and market-chain
analyses. They also lack links with existing enterprises that create backward
linkages and involve business managers in programme design and training.
Obtaining market information, establishing transport links and promoting
trade effectively is often difficult and costly. For example, in the Cuyabeno
Wildlife Reserve in Ecuador, the Cofans of Zabalo independently operate
all eco-tourism services, with complementary marketing and transport
logistic inputs from a larger tourism services firm (Wunder, 2000). In
Indonesian Borneo, marketing and transport networks were established
by the local NGO, SHK-Kaltim, so that high-quality, sustainably-produced
rattan could be transported and sold in national and international markets
as a certified eco-product. A number of rattan-producing villages share
the same networks.21 All these are effective examples of input constraints,
which can be understood in light of the model presented above. Naturally,
the exact nature of these constraints is likely to vary from case to case and
hence, requires more refined analysis than is presented here.
This is certainly true in relation to credit rationing. Nevertheless,
one interpretation of the above results is that donors or NGOs should
20 Since its launch in 1996, the UNCTAD BioTrade Initiative has been promoting
sustainable biotrade in support of the objectives of the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). The Initiative also hosts the BioTrade Facilitation
Programme (BTFP), which focuses on enhancing sustainable bio-resources
management, product development and assisting in processing and marketing.
See: http://www.biotrade.org
21 See: http://www.worldwildlife.org/bsp/kemala/kpshk.htm
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involve themselves in providing more credit to eco-entrepreneurs. Indeed,
historically this has been a common policy prescription in development
circles and there are numerous examples of subsidised credit schemes,
even in the realm of PES (e.g., Campos et al., 2005; Petrick, 2005). However,
by and large, the history of such schemes is littered with defaults, losses
and eventual failure (Petrick, 2005). In part, this is a consequence of
failure to understand the complex causes of credit rationing and the fact
that credit rationing often represents a constrained Pareto optimum. For
instance, Ghosh et al. (2000) show that where moral hazard is the cause,
additional credit need not lead to Pareto improvements and suggest that
such strategies may be resisted by existing lenders. Rather, interventions
should target the root cause of market constraints by reducing asset
inequality, increasing bargaining power for borrowers and improving credit
information networks. While these are not simple recommendations to act
upon, successful micro-finance projects do exist.
There are a host of issues that we have not yet considered that may
be important for forest protection interventions in developing countries.
Similar to those highlighted by F&S, there are issues relating to, for example,
transaction costs, designing and targeting effective contracts and property
rights enforcement. For the most part, these issues are relevant for the cost-
effectiveness of any policy approach despite not being explicit features of
our modelling framework. A critical assumption of our model is the supply
of environmental services in an eco-production process that utilises a unit of
forest being identical to those from a unit of directly conserved forest. In the
real world, eco-production processes vary widely in terms of the process
under consideration in addition to the context in which they are being
implemented. It is likely, however, that the environmental services provided
from eco-production will be inferior to those from pure conserved forest
in many cases. In such cases, the relaxation of this assumption weakens
our result. Nevertheless, much still depends on the characteristics of the
constraint, e.g., its severity, the eco-production process as well as the context
under study.
It is also important to point out that, despite being couched in terms
of activities such as eco-tourism and eco-certification, our results have
wider applicability. Firstly, the model is relevant for the provision of
environmental services via certain agricultural activities, which can be seen
as joint production processes, such as the planting of hedgerows by farmers.
But the idea of relaxing constraints is more general still. For instance, in the
case of the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme, a large reforestation PES
scheme in China, ex post analysis of farmers’ responses to direct payments
to retire cultivated land revealed the role of relaxing market constraints
in achieving dual environmental and poverty objectives. Crucially, it was
found that indirect strategies, targeting important binding constraints such
as weak land tenure or local public goods, might be more cost-effective
means to reduce cultivation at the extensive margin, and increase incomes,
than direct payments (Gauvin et al., 2009; Groom et al., 2009).22
22 Interestingly, both types of approaches relaxed constraints on off-farm labour to
some extent (see Groom et al., 2009).
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This, in turn, highlights the potential for indirect policy approaches both
to maximise cost-effectiveness and alleviate poverty at the same time.
In reality, many policy programmes in developing countries have been
designed with dual goals. Conceptually and empirically, the performance
of policy to achieve dual policy goals has been studied, for example, by Feng
(2007) and Gauvin et al. (2009). They show that while trade-offs exist, better
targeting of environmental providers could improve performance. This,
of course, requires information that may be privately held, thus raising
the problem of strategic behaviour. For cost-effectiveness in our case, we
would need information on constraints that may also be very costly to
obtain. Further complicating the issue is the fact that finding information
on the severity of constraints may be a matter of trial and error given that
providers might not hold this information either.
7. Conclusion
In conclusion, our model results show that, in contrast to F&S, payments for
environmental services are not always more cost-effective than an indirect
approach that relaxes market constraints. Moreover, there are instances
when both parties prefer the indirect approach. Both outcomes are more
likely when rationing is severe. But how relevant is this stylised model
with respect to eco-production processes in the real world? First, model
results hinge on the assumption of equality in supply of environmental
services from eco-production and pure conservation, which may not hold
for many eco-production processes. Moreover, from the discussion of some
empirical examples in the previous section, we observe that many donors
and NGOs transfer capital and other inputs rather than cash for the purchase
of inputs. It is clear that in the absence of heavy outside support many
of these eco-production processes would not be economically viable. Our
model shows that such interventions can be cost-effective where constraints
are severe. Nevertheless, careful empirical research is needed to compare
these outcomes to various counter-factuals.
A final question relates to asking how far such constraints can be used to
explain the supposed dearth of successful eco-entrepreneurs in Africa, Asia
and Latin America in a rapidly expanding global market for eco-products
(as indicated by, for example, the RCW, 2007). In this paper we have focused
only on the possible role of market constraints. Nevertheless, there may
be numerous reasons for the failure for eco-production processes in the
developing world. Therefore, donors would be well advised to identify the
cause of limited eco-production before intervening. In a world of more-
or-less perfect markets, this points to PES for land as suggested by F&S.
Where they can be identified and measured, relaxing constraints could well
be cost-effective in a constrained world.
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Appendix A: Constrained and unconstrained profit function
Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) analyse the profit function when one of the inputs
is constrained. Their analysis completely characterises the Hessian of the
constrained profit function in terms of derivatives of the unconstrained
profit function with respect to prices of unconstrained inputs and ‘virtual’
prices of constrained inputs.
We explore their approach using our simple model.
U (PQ, PF , PK ; z) = max
K ,F
PQ f (F , K ) − PF F − PK K . (11)
This defines the unconstrained profit functions in which the firm is free
to choose the variable inputs, F and K, subject to the fixed inputs, z. Now,
suppose that one of the inputs, K, is constrained such that K = K¯ , the
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constrained profit function can be written as
C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ , z) = max
F
PQ f (F , K¯ ) − PF F − PK K¯
= P (PQ, PF ; K¯ , z) − PK K¯ , (12)
where P(.) is the partial profit function. To define the relationship between
constrained and unconstrained profit functions it is useful to define ‘virtual’
price, Pv, of K as the price that would induce the firm to choose K¯ :
Pv = Pv(PQ, PF ; K¯ , z). (13)
This yields
U (PQ, PF , Pv; z) = max
K ,F
PQ f (F , K ) − PF F − PK K
= P (PQ, PF ; K¯ , z) − Pv K¯ , (14)
which gives a formal definition of Pv : Uv = −K¯ .23 This gives the following
relationship between U and C at Pv:
U(PQ, PF , Pv; z) = C (PQ, PF , Pv; K¯ , z), (15)
and from equations (12) and (14) we get
C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ , z) = U(PQ, PF , Pv; z) + (Pv − PK )K¯ . (16)
Using this relation it is possible to derive the following relationships,
which are used in the derivations in the text (Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993:
99):
CF = UF +
(
Uv + K¯
) ∂ Pv
∂ PF
= UF , (17)
CK¯ = (Pv − PK ) +
(
Uv + K¯
) ∂ Pv
∂ K¯
= (Pv − PK ) . (18)
More importantly, the Hessian of the constrained profit function can be
defined in terms of the second own- and cross-price derivatives of the
unconstrained profit function. The results for inputs F and K¯ are
CK¯ K¯ = −
(
Uvv
)−1
, (19)
CF K¯ = −UF v
(
Uvv
)−1
, (20)
CF F = UF F + UF v
(
Uvv
)−1
UvF . (21)
Were we to present the results for the output Q, the signs in equation (20)
and the second term on the right-hand side of equation (21) would change.
23 Where Uv = ∂
u
∂ Pv
.
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Appendix B: Cost-effectiveness of policy approaches to supply
environmental services – proof of proposition 1
Following F&S we can make a second-order approximation for the change
in profits when additional forest is provided via PES. Dropping z for brevity
we get
C (PQ, PF + d PF , PK ; K¯ ) ≈ C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ ) + CF d PF +
1
2
CF F (d PF )
2
.
The total cost of the intervention can be calculated by subtracting from this
expression the overall cost of the PES intervention to the donor. The cost of
PES is given by the right-hand side of the following expression, where F0
is the initial level of forest cover, and the right-hand side is the deadweight
loss:24
C (PQ, PF + d PF , PK ; K¯ ) − C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ ) +
(
F0 + ∂F
∂ PF
d PF
)
d PF
≈
1
2
∂F
∂ PF
(d PF )
2
. (22)
Following the same procedure yields an expression for the change in profits
following the relaxation of capital constraints:
C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ + d K¯ ) ≈ C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ ) + CK¯ d K¯ +
1
2
CK¯ K¯ (d K )
2
≈ C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ ) +
(
P0v − PK
)
d K
+ 1
2
CK¯ K¯ (d K )
2
.
Subtracting the resource cost of the policy, which in section 3 is assumed to
be PKdK, yields the net profits:25
C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ + d K ) − C (PQ, PF , PK ; K¯ ) − PK d K
≈
1
2
∂ Pv
∂ K¯
(d K )2 + (P0v − PK ) d K , (23)
where P0v is the initial virtual price of capital at K = K¯ . The right-hand side
of equation (22) is a welfare triangle. The right-hand side of equation (23)
contains the welfare triangle and an expression representing the quota rent,
(P0v − PK ), the latter being the marginal value of relaxing the constraint.
These terms are explained graphically in figures 2 and 3 in the text.
24 This is equivalent to expression A4 in F&S, corrected only by the absence of the
minus sign on the RHS.
25 Note that CK¯ = (Pv − PK ) and CK¯ K¯ = ∂ Pv∂ K¯ in the case of a constrained input
(Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993).
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The proof of equation (5) is as follows. Taking the right-hand side of
equation (23) from the right-hand side of equation (22) gives the following
expression:
1
2
[
∂F
∂ PF
(d PF )
2 − ∂ Pv
∂K
(d K )2
]
− (P0v − PK ) d K . (24)
Note that the change in the virtual price of capital as a result of the indirect
approach, d P Iv , is given by
d P Iv =
∂ Pv
∂K
d K . (25)
Similarly, the change in the virtual price as a result of PES is given by26
d P Dv = −
d PF
d K
. (26)
Using relation (3) the first term in square brackets of equation (24) reduces
to dPF. It is then easy to see via substitution of equations (25) and (26) that
equation (24) becomes
1
2
[−d P Dv d K − d P Iv d K ] − (P0v − PK ) d K ,
which is one step from equation (5).
The proof of equation (6) comes from noting that d P Iv = P1Iv − P0v and
d P Dv = P1Dv − P0v .
Appendix C: The donor’s preferences – proof of proposition 2
The donor prefers PES if −dPFF < PKdK. Noting from equations (3) and (4)
that d PF = − 1CF F and d K =
Uvv
UF v
, this becomes
F
CF F
= −F
∂F C/∂ PF
< PK
Uvv
UF v
= PK −∂K
U/∂ Pv
−∂F U/∂ Pv .
Taking the reciprocal and multiplying both sides by PF gives
−∂F
C
∂ PF
PF
F
>
−∂F U/∂ Pv
−∂K U/∂ Pv
PF
PK
.
26 The laborious algebra is as follows: d P Dv = ∂ Pv∂ PF d PF , which noting equation (18)
and using symmetry can be written as d P Dv = CF K¯ d PF = −
UF v
Uvv
d PF . Given
equation (4), this can be written as d P Dv = − d PFd K . Details can be found in Fulginiti
and Perrin (1993: 99).
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Given the symmetry of the unconstrained profit function we have
∂F U/∂ Pv = ∂K U/∂ PF . Inserting this, multiplying top and bottom by K and
rearranging yields in equation (8)27
ηUK F
ηCF F
< ηUK K +
1
K
∂K U
∂ Pv
(
P0v − PK
)
.
27 Note that the numerator of the RHS of equation (8) is equal to − ∂K U
∂ Pv
PK
K , which
would be the point elasticity at Pv but for the fact that it is evaluated at PK. Noting
that PK = (Pv + PK − Pv), the numerator becomes
ηUK K +
1
K
∂K U
∂ Pv
(Pv − PK ) .
From this point it is easy to get equation (8).
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